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FROM ‘MODERNISER’ TO ‘TRADITION-
ALIST’: OSKAR LAFONTAINE AND GERMAN
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s
______________________________________________________________
JÖRG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Oskar Lafontaine’s resignation as finance minister of the Federal Republic, as
chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and as member of the
German parliament on 11 March 1999 was widely perceived as a dramatic epi-
sode in the debate about the future direction of social democracy in Europe.
Directly after the resignation of the second most important politician of the
ruling SPD-Green Party coalition, his decision was explained on four accounts.
First, the relationship between Lafontaine and the German chancellor, Gerhard
Schröder, was understood as a power struggle between the leader of the major
party in government on the one hand, and the leader of the government on the
other. Second, Lafontaine was presented as a ‘traditionalist’, who preached
doctrines about state intervention in the economy that were no longer accept-
able in the global discourse of economic deregulation. Third, in the short period
between the defeat of the Kohl government on 27 September 1998 and his res-
ignation, Lafontaine had gained a certain degree of notoriety as “the most dan-
gerous man in Europe” (The Sun ). In the media, he was presented as too left-
wing a politician to fit into the supposedly more ‘modern’ political project of
the ‘new centre’ in Germany or the ‘third way’ in Britain. Fourth, for the first
time in the history of the German SPD, the resignation of its leader had a
strong impact on the markets: a short term rise of the Euro against the Dollar,
and a sharp rise of stock market prices underlined the satisfaction of some ob-
servers about the end of a long political career.
In the following article, Oskar Lafontaine’s political life will be discussed in or-
der to highlight the shifting meaning of ‘modernity’ in social democratic dis-
course in the Federal Republic and in Europe. The focus will be on Lafontaine’s
failure to transfer successfully his standing as a social democratic ‘moderniser’
(which he possessed in the 1980s) into the 1990s. It will be argued here that
analysis of his failure helps to understand why many social democrats have
abandoned former core beliefs about the corporatist regulation of society in
favour of the ‘chance’ of globalisation, and of market-driven ‘modernisation’.
OSKAR LAFONTAINE’S POLITICAL LIFE
In the second half of the 1980s, Lafontaine belonged to the ‘Enkel’ (grandson)-
generation of younger Social Democratic politicians. They were designated as
forming the core of the next generation of party leaders by their standing in
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relation to the long-time SPD leader Willy Brandt. Other members of the
‘Enkel’-group (the term is a journalistic invention) were Gerhard Schröder,
Rudolf Scharping, and Björn Engholm. Lafontaine gained prominence as a na-
tional political figure earlier, in the first half of the 1980s, when the SPD was in
opposition. He started off as one of the youngest ever elected mayors in Saar-
brücken, a German regional capital, and from 1985 onwards he was prime min-
ister (Ministerpräsident) of the smallest German state, the Saarland. Wherever
he worked in local and regional government, the SPD governed with an abso-
lute majority. Politicians were seen as the most significant players in a power
game in which the dominant role of the state in decision-making was taken for
granted. The strongest impact on Lafontaine’s political thinking at this time was
the decline in the Saarland’s traditional, heavily state-sponsored coal and steel
industries; it was a process which demanded new political strategies and models
of employment. As premier of the Saarland, Lafontaine argued much earlier
than his contemporaries that the old model of growth-triggered full employ-
ment was no longer viable.
Lafontaine’s standing as a ‘moderniser’ of German social democracy in the
1980s resulted primarily from his role as an agenda setter. Under the impact of
the ecological movement and the rise of the Green Party as a parliamentary
competitor to the SPD, Lafontaine argued that industrial societies were unable
to solve either the ecological crisis or the crisis of employment without a new
political project of the left. In strong contrast to what he termed the ‘conserva-
tive modernisation strategy’ of the Kohl government, he put forward his alter-
native agenda of the ‘social and ecological renewal of industrial society’. His
vision included many of the predominant political ideas on the left at that time:
the existence of objective limits to economic growth for ecological reasons, the
need to redefine conceptions of the ‘quality of life’ instead of merely talking
about increases in societal consumption, and the attempt to find answers to
certain risk technologies like atomic energy. In his own words, the “concept of
progress needs to be redefined against the dangerous potential of the moderni-
sation process itself.”1 Lafontaine became one of the first SPD politicians to
argue in favour of coalitions with the Green Party in order to secure majorities
for a reform government of the left.
If perceptions of the ecological crisis provided Lafontaine with much of his
rhetoric about alternative concepts of modernisation, he also focused on the
particular problem of rising unemployment as the main danger for social demo-
cratic policy-making. In debates between the SPD and the German trade union
federation (DGB) in the 1980s about how to fight unemployment, he coined
the term "Arbeitsplatzbesitzer" (job owner), in order to emphasise that partici-
pation in society was dependent on employment; he thereby argued that soli-
darity and other social democratic values could only be defended if
unemployment was kept under control. Against majority opinion in the trade
unions, Lafontaine argued for a cut in working hours accompanied by parallel
cuts in the wage levels of relatively well-to-do trade union members. Challenged
                                                                                                                             
1Lafontaine, ‘Leben in der Risikogesellschaft’, in U. Beck (ed.), Politik in der Risikogesellschaft ,
Frankfurt 1991, p. 212 [all translations by the author]. See also Lafontaine, Die Gesellschaft der
Zukunft, Hamburg 1988.
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on the grounds that a wage labourer by definition never ‘owns’ his workplace,
Lafontaine justified his project by saying that it represented solidarity among
different sectors of labour. His concept was also described as “solidarity within
one class” (Claus Schäfer)2 which stressed that only a trade union driven redis-
tribution of work would defend the system of collective bargaining in the long
term. Thus, Lafontaine tried to bridge the gap between ecological and social
questions in order to redefine the core of SPD beliefs.
Like the Labour Party in Britain, however, the SPD remained in opposition un-
til the late 1990s when new social movements and environmental concerns were
no longer as high on the political agenda as had been the case in the 1980s. Still,
in retrospect, increasing unemployment validated Lafontaine’s argument. The
reduction of working hours that had remained a focal point for the SPD and
German trade unions during the 1990s as a way of tackling unemployment was
neutralised by a rapid improvement in productivity levels. Structural changes in
the workplace consequently limited the political room for manoeuvre for both
the SPD and the trade unions.
1989/90 AND BEYOND
Oskar Lafontaine’s first major disappointment as a politician at the national
level dates back to 1990, the year of German reunification. After being asked by
the West German SPD and by Willy Brandt to serve as candidate for chancellor,
Lafontaine lost his election campaign against Kohl by making the case for a far
slower economic and political integration of the two Germanies. He had to
struggle with a political situation in which his own concerns, like ecology and
social justice, were replaced by a single-issue: Kohl’s rushed progress towards
economic and monetary union between West and East Germany. For the first
time, Lafontaine single-handedly defended political ideas that he had judged
correct against majority opinion and against significant opposition in his own
party.3 He fell out with Willy Brandt (who was in favour of Kohl’s unification
drive) and had to accept internal splits in the SPD because of his unwillingness
to embrace the rapid assimilation of the GDR. Lafontaine pointed out that
Kohl’s plan would crush East Germany’s industrial structure and employment
prospects. Although his bleak prognosis was subsequently proved more accu-
rate than Kohl’s belief in “flourishing landscapes” in the East, he had to con-
cede that the poor SPD showing in 1990 was a personal defeat.
At the beginning of the same year, Lafontaine also experienced a disturbing
event in his personal life. During a campaign meeting of the SPD in North
Rhine-Westphalia, a mentally deranged woman attacked him with a knife and he
suffered critical injuries. At the end of what had, by all accounts, been an ex-
ceptionally difficult year for him, he decided not to stand for party chairman,
and Björn Engholm became the leader. But Engholm’s party career proved to
be short-lived and (following the Barschel affair in his native Schleswig-
Holstein) he retreated from politics permanently in 1993. In reaction to this
                                                                                                                             
2See Lafontaine (ed.), „Das Lied vom Teilen“: Die Debatte über Arbeit und politischen Neubeginn ,
Hamburg 1989.
3For Lafontaine’s account of German politics in the year of reunification see his Deutsche
Wahrheiten: Die nationale und die soziale Frage , Hamburg 1990.
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episode, the SPD attempted a relaunch in putting forward a ‘one member-one
vote’ internal party election for its next chairman. Gerhard Schröder lost the
internal election against Rudolf Scharping, while the third prominent ‘Enkel’,
Oskar Lafontaine, did not take part in the contest.
Under Scharping’s leadership, the party was once more defeated by Kohl in the
1994 national elections and declined afterwards even further in the opinion
polls. At that time, the media focused mostly upon Scharping’s allegedly uncha-
rismatic and weak leadership. Many observers argued that the party’s crisis was
the result of a long-standing power struggle within the ‘Enkel’ group. Thus, the
conflict within the leadership was portrayed as a personal issue between
Scharping and Schröder while Lafontaine remained in the background and kept
a low profile. Schröder, by contrast, used his position as SPD shadow secretary
for economic affairs to advocate his personal opinions that were never dis-
cussed inside the party but made his name as a ‘moderniser’. Scharping’s move
to dismiss Schröder from the shadow cabinet for an alleged breach of party loy-
alty only resulted in a further increase of the latter’s media coverage. It therefore
came as a surprise to observers when it was in fact Lafontaine who challenged
Scharping for the party leadership during the 1995 party conference. In a rous-
ing speech he appealed to the party faithful that “only if we ourselves are filled
with enthusiasm will it be possible to inspire enthusiasm in others” and con-
vinced the delegates that he would be the right person to rebuild the party and
engineer a future SPD-led government.4
PARTY LEADER UNDER PRESSURE
From the very beginning of Lafontaine’s leadership, however, it became clear
that he would not be the darling of the media. His political ideas were largely
ignored, while his relationship with Schröder started to assume centre-stage.
Until the end of Lafontaine’s career, the relationship between the two politi-
cians was stereotypically presented as a duel between the ‘party man’ and the
‘moderate moderniser’. While Schröder could play the media at will, Lafontaine
invited criticism with his new found emphasis on tackling unemployment by
linking productivity increases to parallel increases in wages. By now, the latter
was convinced that wage levels which had declined as a result of supply-side
economic strategies were, in turn, responsible for triggering an even further in-
crease in unemployment levels. He insisted that an SPD-led government should
deliver some improvements for wage earners through redistribution.5 Schröder,
                                                                                                                             
4 The weekly Spiegel 47/1995, pp. 22-37, commented on Lafontaine’s party conference tri-
umph over Scharping on 16 November 1995 ironically, by portraying the newly elected party
chairman in Superman outfit on the cover under the headline “The saviour?“ In a very sober
assessment of Lafontaine’s “Napoleonic personality“, it was pointed out that even a politician
of his standing would be unable to reconcile the challenges of global competition with the
German social model. Lafontaine’s conference claim that he would lead the SPD into the
“solar age“ was never heard of again – presumably because the party dropped the language of
ecological modernisation in favour of the language of economic competitiveness.
5Lafontaine/C. Müller, Keine Angst vor der Globalisierung , Bonn 1996 (also published in English).
Lafontaine’s redistributive agenda remained rather unspecific. If challenged, he usually re-
treated into general comments and pointed out that a “well-balanced” approach to redistribu-
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on the other hand, ignored the party faithful and distanced himself from La-
fontaine. Instead, he was keen to be seen with successful managers and the
leadership of the Federation of German Industry (BDI).
Although both Lafontaine and Schröder strongly denied their contradictory
approach in public, their conflict was reflected in opinion polls. It was suggested
that the SPD would be able to win against Kohl with Schröder as candidate for
chancellor, while the ‘leftist’ Lafontaine would fail to convince the centrist
German public. After Schröder’s re-election as premier in the German state of
Lower Saxony on 1 March 1998 with a slightly improved party share of the
vote, it became clear that he had secured the SPD’s candidature for chancellor
and that Lafontaine would no longer attempt to stop him. In the subsequent
build-up to the national election, Schröder seemed to count exclusively on a
diffuse mood in public opinion and the media for ‘change’ and the German
public’s weariness with sixteen years of Kohl-rule. Lafontaine, by contrast, de-
manded that the SPD should commit itself programmatically to move away
from neo-liberalism in favour of a ‘just’ social policy for wage earners and fami-
lies.
Schröder, however, carefully avoided any programmatic commitment. The
SPD’s campaign strategy under the slogan of ‘innovation and justice’ (which, in
its planning stage, had also involved party leader Lafontaine), was broadly un-
derstood as a form of job-sharing between both politicians. While Lafontaine
convinced the party of the adherence to party principles, Schröder played the
role of mediator currying favour with the right ‘contacts’ in business and the
media. Hence, Lafontaine’s strong association with a set of political ideas
(judged by the media as too left-wing) was balanced out in public perception by
Schröder’s laissez faire attitude. In fact, Schröder never tried to put forward a
grand programme for German society. Contrary to Lafontaine’s denunciation of
neo-liberalism , he argued that there no longer was a ‘left’ or ‘right’ economic
policy, but only a ‘modern’ one.
The political ambivalence of the SPD between Lafontaine’s day-to-day man-
agement and ‘media-man’ Schröder remained unresolved. In fact, it formed the
core of the SPD’s campaign strategy itself. Until election day on the 27 Septem-
ber 1998, most observers believed opinion polls which suggested a grand coali-
tion between the Christian Democrats and the SPD. Firmly convinced that the
SPD would have to balance out a grand coalition with the conservatives, the
pact between Schröder and Lafontaine seemed to provide the best way to
maximise SPD influence in a grand coalition. In the event, however, the SPD
and the Green Party gained a comfortable majority, and the new ‘red-green’
coalition government elected Schröder as chancellor. Lafontaine became fi-
nance minister and Scharping, the third ‘Enkel’, was persuaded to give up his
position as parliamentary leader of the SPD and became defence minister.
THE SHORT VICTORY
The victory grew sour in a matter of days. The government was met by hostility
from the media and opposition from representatives of many economic sectors.
                                                                                                                             
tion was needed – which was an attempt to avoid open conflict with majority opinion in the
media.
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Lafontaine was singled out in the press as the strong man while Schröder was
claimed to be under his control. Consequently, Schröder was seen as being un-
able to ensure that the political strategy of the ‘new centre’ would be imple-
mented. Nearly all government initiatives quickly turned into disappointments.
The attempt to introduce a new, more liberal citizenship law to make it easier
for foreigners to adopt German citizenship triggered a strong CDU counter-
mobilisation in the streets, and simultaneously firm resistance from the electric-
ity companies confronted plans for a step-by-step retreat from atomic energy.
Already associated with the position of an ‘agenda manager’, Lafontaine was
eager to put forward his political project of a more ‘just’ taxation system. His
proposals included some elements of redistribution in order to increase con-
sumer demand. Meanwhile, Schröder seemed to be unwilling to provide strong
leadership in public and his ‘shadow’ Lafontaine had to accept that most of the
blame for ‘co-ordination mistakes’ within the government was placed at his
door.6 With the advantage of hindsight, a large amount of tactical behaviour is
detectable on Schröder’s part. His frequent appearances in television game
shows and his image makeover as the ‘cashmere chancellor’ gained him a repu-
tation as a figure who seemed fascinated by the glamour of power while avoid-
ing the trappings of political decision-making itself.7
Government infighting soon developed into an inter-ministerial conflict. La-
fontaine and a number of dissident economists (who came to staff his finance
ministry) were under constant fire from the chancellor’s office. Although they
avoided open conflict, the team around Lafontaine was effectively isolated.
Faced with this situation, Lafontaine seemed to believe that domestic weak-
nesses could be compensated for by an offensive on the international stage. At
a meeting of the G-7 finance ministers, he put forward plans to introduce corri-
dor exchange rates for currencies on a global scale to counter international fi-
nancial speculation. At the EU-level he pressed for tax harmonisation to
counter ‘race to the bottom’ competition among EU member states, and de-
manded a redefinition of the responsibilities of the European Central Bank in
order to include the creation of employment as one of its key tasks.
Lafontaine claimed that his proposals were merely putting forward conventional
wisdom. However, the existence of a continuing and broad academic debate
                                                                                                                             
6 The weekly Spiegel 44/1998, pp. 22-5, argued soon after the elections that Schröder and La-
fontaine had to clarify the question of leadership: „Not yet really established in their offices,
the chancellor and his shadow need a second start for a new beginning. Then it will probably
be established whom is placed in whose shadow“. At that time, the possibility of solving the
problem by removing one of the two players was not yet suggested.
7 K.-R. Korte has pointed out that the political leader Schröder has “united by his style, less by
programmatic integration formulas” and that “efficient governmental agency is much more
equivalent to indecision and moderation in the twighlight of pre-decision-making”. See “Das
System Schröder. Wie der Kanzler das Netzwerk seiner Macht knüpft”, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 25 October 1999. The theatre director Claus Peymann, Der Tagesspiegel, 28 November
1999, added: “We have a chancellor who has transformed himself into a moderator, a talk-
master of politics. This man is just reading his texts. This is bad theatre. And as a director I
can judge him: he is not too bad an actor”.
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about the future architecture of the international financial system did not
change the fact that it was highly utopian for a German finance minister to be-
lieve that he would be powerful enough to demand institutional change without
seeking the support of the US first. In the media spotlight, Lafontaine loved to
talk about ‘grand ideas’ and was always willing to quote think tank memoranda
about the growing international support for his demand-oriented alternative
economic strategy. But as far as the domestic agenda was concerned, Lafontaine
ignored the danger that he was exposing himself as the one person in govern-
ment who had to be removed in order to trigger a fundamental change of gov-
ernment policy.
RESIGNATION FROM OFFICE
It was therefore by no means coincidental that domestic policy problems pre-
pared the stage for the final attack on the tax reformer Lafontaine. After one
hundred days in government, it had become clear that the reform of the tax
system would be one of the central projects of the new government. Sources
close to Schröder briefed the media to underline that the chancellor demanded
his own agenda be implemented and that Lafontaine’s autonomy as a finance
minister was strictly limited. At the same time, however, Schröder’s alternative
agenda was never explicitly spelt out, which made it difficult to know what was
actually expected from Lafontaine – truly a no-win situation from the finance
minister’s point of view. In public, this conflict inside government was played
out as media-driven excitement about the ‘correctness’ or ‘incorrectness’ of dif-
ferent scenarios for government-induced tax reduction for different social
groups.
In February 1999, extensive lobbying by the electricity companies against the
finance minister’s allegedly ‘ruinous’ taxation levels (earmarked to pay for the
step-by-step retreat from atomic energy) prepared the stage for the final act: the
resignation of Lafontaine. Schröder’s statement in a cabinet meeting on 8 March
1999 that he would be unwilling to take responsibility for a government working
‘against’ industry and commerce was interpreted by Lafontaine as a threat by the
chancellor to resign, if he himself did not leave the government. In the event,
the resignation to come was also triggered by Lafontaine’s own awareness that
the structural budget deficit would demand austerity measures and hence the
exact opposite of what he himself had publicly sought in terms of redistribu-
tion.8
Following his resignation, the ‘red-green’ government installed a new finance
minister, Hans Eichel (SPD), and readjusted its strategy. The new course was
dominated by austerity measures in all parts of the budget in order to limit the
‘structural budget deficit’, defined for reasons of political convenience as
amounting to DM 30 billion. The media immediately joined in the effort to pre-
sent the austerity measures as ‘social justice for future generations’ and the un-
charismatic Eichel was presented as ‘honest Hans’, moving away from the
fringe beliefs of his predecessor. By the end of 1999, the government had put
forward far reaching plans for future tax cuts without outlining how the conse-
quent decrease in the state budget would be dealt with on the expenditure side.
                                                                                                                             
8For a chronology of Lafontaine’s time in office, see Spiegel 40/1999, pp. 115-30.
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The discussion of ‘grand ideas’ for the future of the world economy and about
the conflict between Keynesianism and neo-liberalism  died down immediately
after Lafontaine’s resignation.
FROM ‘MODERNISER’ TO ‘TRADITIONALIST’
Oskar Lafontaine’s short career in government underlines the changing agenda
of social democracy in Europe. In order to understand why Lafontaine has
fallen victim to the changing course of ‘modernisation’ one has to remember his
political formation. His career in the SPD was a prime example for the Modell
Deutschland  debate of the 1970s. This model (later termed ‘Rhenish capitalism’)
was characterised by strong corporatist intermarriage between SPD, state and
trade unions, buttressed by a consensus-oriented style of decision-making. Such
corporatist procedures were familiar territory for Lafontaine given his experi-
ence in the Saarland where he dealt with heavily state-dependent declining in-
dustries. His readiness to embrace the agenda of the 1980s and his attempt to
forge a dialogue between the SPD and the ecological and peace movement
made him a moderniser within the SPD at that time. However, he always re-
mained close to a state-guided consensus model, and intended to make a social
democratic state work under changing circumstances.
In the 1990s, by contrast, the consensus model itself started to be blamed for
numerous shortcomings. It was challenged by contradictory interpretations of
the globalisation process and the related claim that existing models of corpora-
tist modernisation inside the nation-state were no longer viable. Modernisation
was hence no longer understood as being primarily defined by the political sys-
tem, but was seen as resulting from structural change in the economy. The role
of politicians, therefore, was no longer to act as advocates of ‘grand ideas’ in
order to reconcile industrial society and environmental concerns. Instead, their
role became limited to the more modest function of mediating between the
competing interests in society. Contrary to older social democratic models, a
consensus could no longer be guaranteed and a split within the social demo-
cratic electorate between winners and losers of the modernisation process began
to be taken for granted. Inside the SPD, Lafontaine and Schröder became the
role models for the two conflicting types of politicians: on the one hand the
advocate of ‘grand ideas’ (the ‘traditionalist’), on the other, the mediator who
self-consciously limited himself to pragmatic political management inside the
boundaries determined by others (the ‘moderniser’).9
Das Herz schlägt links
How, then, has the “traditionalist“ Lafontaine analysed his failure as a politician
in government? Just in time for the Frankfurt book fair, the ‘private citizen’ La-
fontaine reappeared in public to promote his account of events, entitled “Das
Herz schlägt links.” The book is partly an account of the history of the SPD in
the 1990s and partly an analysis of neo-liberalism . It concludes with a critique
of the superficiality of media-driven political cultures and quotes with approval
                                                                                                                             
9In Britain’s case, John Lloyd has described this modesty as far as grand ideas in social demo-
cratic politics are concerned as the “lack of grand narratives” and as the “replacement of the
political intellectual”. See “Intellectuals and New Labour”, Prospect, November 1999, pp. 22-7.
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Jean Baudrillard’s dictum that the political class has “lost its specific charac-
ter.”10 Lafontaine certainly does not include himself here: he understands his
chairmanship of the SPD as an attempt to redefine social democratic policy
under the impact of globalisation. He argues that the perception of a social ‘jus-
tice gap’ (Gerechtigkeitslücke) in society determined the outcome of the 1998
German federal election. From his point of view, the new government of SPD
and Green Party was asked by the electorate to break away from neo-liberalism .
Lafontaine claims to have been at the forefront of a truly social democratic re-
sponse to the neo-liberal  challenge - in sharp contrast to Schröder and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair and their ‘new centre/third way’ concept of com-
promising with it.
The book’s main themes are a critique of flexible labour markets and the anar-
chy in financial markets. Lafontaine is keen to point out that freedom and flexi-
bility do not coincide in the work place: “To be free one needs secure
employment.” 11 Social democracy, according to Lafontaine, should try not to
accommodate increasing deregulation in the work place but should provide a
political framework of re-regulation. Lafontaine insists that any project of re-
regulation needs to focus on the operation of financial markets: “Social demo-
cratic policy-making will only be possible in the future if the operation of world
financial markets is changed... I intended to use the office of German finance
minister to support a reconstruction of world financial markets and to fight
against financial speculation.”12 Basically, Lafontaine argues that there is an in-
ternational debate about the re-regulation of financial markets and that his own
political ideas should be judged in this wider context. Lafontaine asks many
necessary questions without, however, providing any convincing answers.
POLITICS IN THE MARKET PLACE
He claims, for instance, that the deregulation of the financial markets did not
evolve ‘naturally’ in the market place, but was put forward as a pre-eminently
political project in the 1980s. The Asian crisis and a number of spectacular
crashes of American investment funds are taken as proof that political control is
needed over markets. According to Lafontaine, private investors expect the in-
ternational financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) to bail them out if some-
thing goes wrong and demand taxpayer’s money in the final instance. He is
eager to point out that the very same people otherwise argue against any regu-
latory state intervention in financial markets as a matter of principle. Lafontaine
would like to see international financial institutions reformed and asks for a co-
ordinated monetary and financial policy in order to stimulate growth, price sta-
bility and stable exchange rates. He quotes the 1994 report of an American
commission under the chairmanship of the former head of the Federal Reserve
Board, Paul Volcker, which recommended the global co-ordination of macro-
economic strategies, the planning of growth and stability targets, the interna-
                                                                                                                             
10Lafontaine, Das Herz schlägt links, München 1999, p. 264.
11ibid., p. 271.
12ibid., p. 201, 134.
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tional co-ordination of the economic cycle and, in general terms, a “Keynesian
financial strategy.”13
However, Lafontaine is unable to explain why such recipes have been ignored in
practical policy-making. His description of market instability and currency
speculation certainly sounds familiar to every newspaper reader. But when it
comes to answering these questions, Lafontaine can in effect only put forward a
contemporary version of the old social democratic slogan of the ‘programming’
of capitalism, i.e. of a capitalism without crisis and of markets without losers.14
Furthermore, many of Lafontaine’s claims lack coherence. This is clearly the
case when he points out that the contemporary American economic policy of
‘easy money’ is much closer to his own ideas about demand stimulation than the
policy of the European Central Bank. But is it really fair to attribute the con-
temporary American boom primarily to the Federal Reserve and even “Keyne-
sianism”? If it is, Lafontaine is one of the very few who would explain it that
way. It certainly does not account for the strength of neo-liberal  discourse in
the 1990s on both sides of the Atlantic. The same is true for his criticism of
Tony Blair. On the one hand, Blair is described as a “media phenomenon” but
Lafontaine claims at the same time that “Blair has delivered many neo-liberal
speeches but has not put forward a neo-liberal  policy.”15 He even singles out
Anthony Giddens for praise because of some remarks (in his tract The Third
Way) about the need to defend redistribution as an essential part of the social
democratic agenda.16 Should one therefore account for the conflict within
Europe’s social democrats as purely semantic while practical policy-making
tends to converge towards a common agenda?
SCHRÖDER-BLAIR JOINT PAPER
In fact, Lafontaine is keen to avoid hard choices between the ‘traditional’ and
the ‘modernising’ narrative of social democracy. According to him, both narra-
tives could still have been reconciled until the ‘Schröder-Blair joint paper’ was
published in June 1999.17 From Lafontaine’s point of view, the ‘joint paper’ (put
                                                                                                                             
13ibid., pp. 199- 220.
14Most social democratic parties in Europe developed their own one-nation based theory of
the ‘programming’ of capitalism in order to integrate trade unions into state-guided ‘growth
strategies’ and to ‘modernise’ societies. Such rhetoric reached its peak in the 1970s. Since then
it has declined and is no longer part of the discourse of ‘new’ Labour in Britain and the ‘new
centre’ SPD in Germany. It is still in use in France.
15Lafontaine, op. cit., p. 185.
16 Lafontaine quotes with approval Gidden‘s remark that “inheritance taxation should be high
to make sure that not too many privileges can be handed down from one generation to the
next” (op.cit., p. 304). He ignores, however, that Giddens is fully in tune in with Blair‘s agenda
of withdrawing welfare payments if recipients are not willing to take up low-paid jobs and that
both praise ‘flexibility’ of the workforce as the most important resource of a modern econ-
omy, a claim with which Lafontaine would strongly disagree.
17 See “Der Weg nach vorn für Europas Sozialdemokraten. Ein Vorschlag von Gerhard
Schröder und Tony Blair vom 8. Juni 1999”, Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik ,
7/1999, pp. 887-96.
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forward as a de facto  manifesto for the European elections) constituted both a
shift to the right, as well as a break with the wishes of the German electorate.
However, Lafontaine’s interpretation of the paper as ‘fashionable talk’ and as a
bad summary of Giddens ignored an important fact: the paper did explain what
Schröder and Blair wanted to place on the agenda. The paper proposed a “new
supply–side agenda of the left” and argued for lower business taxes, active pro-
motion of small and medium enterprises, labour market flexibility, reform of the
“rigidity and over-regulation” and transformation of the welfare state from “a
net of dependents to a springboard to self-responsibility.”18 While the paper was
mostly ignored in the United Kingdom (and was in fact just another example of
new Labour-speak), it had a certain resonance with the German public.
This was not so much due to what was said, but rather to what was omitted.
The paper’s language lacked the usual reassurance that the corporatist system of
German governance would be maintained. It sounded much more like a paper
of the German (market-) liberal FDP party.19 From Lafontaine’s point of view,
the ‘joint paper’ split European social democrats into two camps: the French
socialists who distanced themselves from it and the Schröder/Blair leadership.20
Moreover, it is true that ‘Lafontaine-speak’ and the programmatic self-
description of the French Socialists are not only close to each other, but coin-
cide exactly.21 What has to be asked, however, is to what extent the contradic-
tory self-description of these ‘two camps’ is met by substantial differences in
practical policy-making. Lafontaine stops short from asking if the debate is
merely symbolic, and does not answer the question of why social democratic
discourse has changed. In the end, his book turns into full-blown cultural criti-
cism. He draws a parallel between the media-driven policy process - moving
ever faster from one topic to another - and the fate of the flexible individual
who is no longer able to establish relationships of trust with fellow citizens.22
                                                                                                                             
18 ibid.
19 The Liberals scored a point in putting forward the paper under their own party logo for
approval in the Bundestag.
20 In fact, there was little support for the joint paper by leading SPD figures. The comment by
the social policy expert Rudolf Dressler was typical: he argued “this paper does not serve the
manifestation of political intentions but rather its camouflage. Such dissimulation is obviously
part of a strategy to avoid decisions about the political direction whenever possible“ (a state-
ment from 1999, as quoted in FAZ, 17 March 2000).
21Compare, for instance, the following with Lafontaine’s position: “It is necessary and possible
to regulate capitalism by using a anti-cyclical policy, the development of the social system, the
preference of education and vocational training and the commitment towards an income pol-
icy”, quoted from “Die gebändigte Modernität des Lionel Jospin, Eine Art Antwort auf das
Schröder/Blair Papier/ Der Beitrag der Sozialistischen Partei Frankreichs zum Kongress der
Sozialistischen Internationale in Paris”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 October 1999. While the
French manifesto reads like a chapter of Lafontaine’s book, Lionel Jospin’s article “Only on
our terms”, Guardian , 16 November 1999, reads like a summary.
22 Under clear influence of Richard Sennet‘s book The Corrosion of Character, Lafontaine argues
that “a job-hopper society in which many people have to live without social security and are
forced to permanent job-related mobility is not a humane society” (op. cit., p. 272).
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To sum it up, Lafontaine’s account is by no means a rallying cry to form a ‘La-
fontaine movement’ within the SPD; it is much more a personal memoir about
what it was like to leave the stage of public life.
A PARTY UNITED AGAINST ITS FORMER CHAIRMAN
Even more interesting than the book itself was the reaction it triggered inside
SPD circles. Immediately after its publication, one leading SPD politician after
another queued up to voice strong disappointment about Lafontaine’s breach of
party discipline. He was criticised for disclosing internal party business, for his
attack on Schröder’s lack of ‘team spirit’, and for his decision to resign from
office because of his political disappointment about the course of the ‘red-
green’ coalition instead of fighting his own corner.23 Some of Lafontaine’s for-
mer colleagues did not stop short from claiming that he was merely making
money out of his book - a complaint which, at least when voiced by advocates
of the ‘new’ business-friendly SPD, sounded rather odd.24 The debate under-
lined the fact that most SPD politicians were keen to settle finally the question
of party leadership, which had kept the ‘Enkel’ group busy throughout the
1990s. Schröder was asked to take over Lafontaine’s position as party chairman
and was duly elected at a special party conference in April 1999, although with
little enthusiasm.
There are three stages to the impact of Lafontaine’s book on his party. In the
first stage (directly after the publication) Schröder was subjected to a couple of
party meetings with the rank and file, which went badly for him. He was criti-
cised less for his policies, and more for his image as a person who loved to wear
expensive suits, and for his habit of smoking cigars in public. Lafontaine capi-
talised on widespread disappointment in the SPD and appeared on television to
discuss his criticism of the party’s course with other retired senior SPD mem-
bers.25 He felt vindicated by the poor showing of the SPD in a number of re-
gional elections in which many former SPD voters had stayed at home.
In the second stage, Schröder readjusted his strategy by bringing some of his
moderate critics into government and made symbolic concessions to the SPD-
wing formerly associated with Lafontaine.26 In the third stage, the debate fo-
cused on the ‘newness’ of the SPD and the extent to which the system of cor-
                                                                                                                             
23 The media showed disappointment in losing their favourite target, Lafontaine, and invented
the German term Amtsflucht (flight from office) to account for his unexpected resignation.
24 A number of SPD politicians made it clear that they would not read the book and that they
strongly disagreed with its content. Günter Grass asked Lafontaine to “shut up“ and not to
spend his time writing books but to concentrate more on wine consumption.
25 During the TV appearance (10 October 1999), he specifically attacked Blair and the idea
that a higher degree of labour flexibility would increase standards of living in the long run. He
also stressed the poor condition of public services in Britain and asked the German public not
to accept the “Anglo-American model”. More people watched Lafontaine‘s appearance than
had watched Schröder‘s appearance the week before on the same programme.
26 The most prominent case is Reinhold Klimmt who had succeeded Lafontaine as premier of
the Saarland and was brought into the cabinet as transport secretary after losing the regional
elections there on 6 September 1999 against a CDU challenger.
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poratist decision-making in Germany was still applied. At this point, Schröder
was challenged suddenly by a practical problem. In November 1999, the build-
ing site contractor Philip Holzmann (one of the biggest German employers) was
threatened with bankruptcy and the loss of 50,000 jobs after its financial backers
claimed the company economically unviable. Schröder used the opportunity and
assumed the role of crisis manager by making state credits available to rescue
the company. The decision was celebrated at a meeting between the chancellor
and Holzmann workers, where Schröder symbolically embraced a group in soci-
ety who had traditionally voted SPD. While the Holzmann crisis occupied the
headlines, the Lafontaine debate died down. At the same time, the rhetoric of
the Schröder-Blair joint paper about the need to prevent the state from inter-
fering in the economy evaporated. What the Holzmann affair underlined was
the fact that a political culture of strongly-rooted corporatism such as the Ger-
man one appears more solid than any programmatic declaration. Moreover,
German and British political culture are too far apart to be able to bridge the
distance with “joint papers”.
SCHRÖDER - ‘A RE-INCARNATION OF LAFONTAINE’?
Apart from the symbolic value of the Holzmann ‘rescue’ for SPD self-
consciousness, the international reactions to Schröder’s decision also proved
interesting. While the German press was evenly split over Schröder’s decision to
use state money to bail out a private company, the international press attacked
him for “no longer speaking as a wannabe Blairite, but almost like a reincarna-
tion of Mr Lafontaine.”27 Hence, Lafontaine’s former role to be held responsi-
ble for the weakness of the Euro was now transferred to Schröder. Wim
Duisenberg, president of the European Central Bank, singled him out for dam-
aging Europe’s image as a “market-driven economy.”28
Moreover, the special relationship between Blair and Schröder (if there ever was
one) no longer features highly on the agenda, either. Schröder’s public criticism
of the hostile take-over bid by the British telecommunications company Vo-
daphone for the German company Mannesman in December 1999 triggered
British disapproval.29 His parallel support for tax harmonisation in the EU had
been voiced earlier by Lafontaine. This, however, does not make Schröder the
reincarnation of his predecessor as SPD leader. It is certainly an oversimplifica-
                                                                                                                             
27 I. Karacs, “A cold wind spoils Mr Schroeder’s new stance”, The Independent , 4 December
1999.
28 International Herald Tribune , 4-5 December 1999. The same article points out that “rightly or
wrongly, Mr Schroeder has reaped much of the blame for the single currency’s embarrassing
plunge late Thursday below dollar parity – the unofficial benchmark of the euro – weakness.”
29 Karacs (footnote 22) points out that in Schröder‘s “guise of saviour of the German firm
Mannesman from the clutches of Vodaphone, he has tilted against the windmills of Anglo-
American capitalism. The message: takeovers are good when a German company gobbles up a
foreign firm, but terrible the other way round – they damage society.” The weekly Spiegel
6/2000, pp. 78-82 argued after Vodaphone’s take-over of Mannesman on 4 February 2000
that this first successful take-over bid against the resistance of the management in German
history “marks the end of Rheinish capitalism.”
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tion to believe that corporatist bargaining and state intervention in the economy
could simply be wished away by political leaders following a changing policy
fashion. Schröder’s style of leadership has generally tended to avoid open con-
flict. At the same time, however, the main constituencies of German corpora-
tism can no longer take it for granted that they will receive a ‘fair’ stake in the
outcome of bargaining. In fact, the ‘joint paper’, with its claim to provide a
“new supply-side agenda of the left”, has not gone away as far as domestic pol-
icy-making is concerned. One has only to look at the reform of the German tax
system (“Steuerreform 2000”)  as presented by Lafontaine’s successor as finance
minister, Hans Eichel. This reform has focused primarily on tax relief for busi-
ness and its main beneficiaries have been German insurance companies and
banks whose shares rose spectacularly in response to the plan.30 Schröder and
Eichel both claimed the tax concessions to business to be fiscally neutral and
expect them to kick-start the German economy. Such a one-sided approach
would not have been possible under the chairmanship of Lafontaine.
CONCLUSION
Any characterisation of the discourse of the German SPD needs to stress its
internal ambivalence. As in the writings of Antony Giddens, the SPD does in
fact try to reconcile the social democratic and the neo-liberal  narrative of mod-
ernity and intends to create its own national blend of reacting to the image of
the global marketplace. If that process has – apart from Lafontaine’s resignation
– not resulted in stronger internal party conflict, it is due to the wholeheartedly
pragmatic approach of the post-Lafontaine SPD leadership. The mediator
Schröder and his team do no longer aspire to offer ‘grand ideas’ about how the
world works. It is here that one can identify why Lafontaine lost his agenda-
setting function as a ‘modernising’ politician. In contrast to his colleagues, he
remained fond of the idea that social democracy, by its very history, had always
encapsulated ‘modernisation’. What distinguished him from Schröder was his
refusal to depart from the idea that the function of politicians in society is not
only to mediate but also to outline in what direction society should go.
The ‘man of ideas’ could not accept that the 1990s no longer provided him with
issues, which enabled him to sustain his concept of the ecological and social
modernisation of industrial societies. Lafontaine always portrayed such mod-
ernisation as building on the foundations of regulated and ‘civilised’ capitalism,
as erected historically by his party. In his mind, the reconciliation of social
democratic core values (incorporating traditions of the workers’ movement and
of industrial society) with ecological values (symbolising the critique of indus-
trial society) was evidently the way forward to redefine “progress” against what
he himself had called earlier “the dangerous potential of the modernisation pro-
cess itself.”31 But modernisation without adjectives  takes over more and more of
                                                                                                                             
30 The shares of Deutsche Bank and of Allianz Versicherung  nearly doubled their value in a matter
of days in reaction to the Eichel plan, which will abolish taxation of banks and insurance com-
panies if they decide to sell their cross shareholdings in other companies. This decision is ex-
pected to fundamentally change the composition of German businesses (until now often
characterised by the intermarriage between banks and industry).
31 See footnote 2.
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social democratic discourse, and Oskar Lafontaine can only find some degree of
satisfaction in the fact that he has become one of its most prominent victims.
